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Abstract
 
We develop tests of financial intermediation by national banking systems that exploit regional financial and
economic data.  Derived from a model of bank profit maximization, the tests are based on the expectation
that in efficient systems, financial intermediation should not be overly influenced by policy variables;
should be greater where projects are more profitable and require greater financing—typically in faster
growing, richer, industrial areas; and should direct funds to the best projects regardless of where deposits
originate.  We apply these tests to Chinese provincial data from 1991-97 for all state banks, the Agricultural
Bank of China, rural credit cooperatives, and other financial institutions.  China implemented a series of
widely publicized financial reforms in the mid-1990s designed to improve bank performance.  However,
descriptive and estimation results suggest that the importance of state bank policy lending (to support SOEs
and finance agricultural procurement) has increased, not fallen, during the recent period, and lending does
not respond to economic fundamentals.  Only the group of smaller, less-regulated financial institutions
appear commercially oriented.  Despite reforms, significant barriers to efficient inter-regional financial
intermediation remain.
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1.  Introduction
As economies grow, financial institutions play an increasingly important role in
directing financial resources to their most productive use.  Through their greater size and
scope, they are better able than informal institutions to safeguard deposits, diversify
portfolio risk, provide liquidity to borrowers and depositors, and achieve economies of
scale in evaluating projects and providing financial services.  The depth of financial
intermediation (loans as a share of GDP) has been shown to be positively associated with
both the level of development (GDP per capita) and the rate of economic growth.
1     
The literature’s emphasis on the size of the financial sector overlooks differences
in how well available resources are allocated.  The recent Asian financial crisis and the
experience of banks in transition economies (Bonin and Szekely, 1994), as well as
historically poor bank performance in Latin America and Africa (Haggard and Lee, 1995;
Nissanke, 1998), highlight the difficulty of establishing successful commercial banking
systems that allocate financial resources efficiently.  Policy lending, barriers to inter-
regional lending, distorted pricing, poor managerial incentives, and lack of prudential
financial regulation all can undermine financial performance.
 This paper proposes a new approach to assess the effectiveness of financial
intermediation by national banking systems.  The tests, derived from a model of bank
profit maximization, exploit regional financial and economic data and are based on the
expectation that in efficient systems, financial intermediation should not be overly
influenced by policy variables; should be greater where projects are more profitable and
                                                
1 See Gertler and Rose (1996), Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and
Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Financial intermediation can also occur through equity markets, but in China
the stock market is small and tightly regulated.2
require greater financing—typically in faster growing, richer, and more industrial areas;
and should direct funds to the best projects regardless of where deposits originate.
We then apply these tests to the case of China.  The Asian financial crisis has
heightened scrutiny of China’s state banking system, whose fragility stems from the
continued use of the financial system to support urban-based state-owned enterprises
(Brandt and Zhu, forthcoming).  Recent estimates suggest that more than one quarter of
the loans of China’s four major state-owned banks are non-performing, and that
technically these banks are insolvent (Lardy, 1998).  1997 provincial data reveals a
striking inverse relationship between financial intermediation and GDP per capita that is
at odds with the empirical regularity of positive correlation found in cross-country studies
(Figure 1).  This pattern suggests that the allocation of financial resources across
provinces may be highly inefficient, with richer provinces being taxed relative to poor
provinces (Sehrt, 1999; Lardy, 1998).
In recent years, the Chinese leadership has recognized the importance of
improving financial intermediation and has made financial reforms a top policy priority.
The most sweeping changes were implemented in the mid-1990s—relaxation of binding
credit plans following the 1993 anti-inflation campaign, centralization of PBC relending
to reduce excessive local influence on central bank financing of loans, a shift to ratio
management of loans that gave more autonomy to state banks to reallocate funds among
provincial branch offices, adoption of a new Commercial Bank Law to improve
managerial incentives and prudential financial regulation, establishment of policy banks
to separate policy from commercial lending, and the establishment of a national, unified
interbank market.  This paper provides initial empirical evidence on the effect of these
reforms on loan allocation decisions.  We examine the performance of different Chinese3
financial institutions before and after the reforms:  all state banks (including specialized
and policy banks); the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), a specialized bank which later
spun off China’s largest policy bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China
(ADBC); rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), the largest financial institution other than
state banks, with a branch structure reaching to villages; and other financial institutions
(OFIs), including urban cooperatives and Urban Cooperative Banks, national and
regional commercial banks, and national trust and investment companies--a small but
dynamic part of the financial sector.
We find that the effect of policy concerns on lending by state specialized and
policy banks, such as to support state-owned enterprises and grain procurement, has been
significant and, if anything, has increased since the financial reforms in the mid-1990s.
Economic fundamentals have had little effect on total lending by state banks, but there is
evidence that separation of policy and commercial lending through the establishment of
the ADBC has enabled the ABC to become more commercially oriented.  Among other
financial institutions, RCCs seem poorly integrated into financial markets, but the small
but rapidly growing group of other financial institutions (OFIs) has been most responsive
to economic fundamentals.  While recent reforms of state banks, including reforms after
1997, and the growth of OFIs hold promise for future performance, remaining restrictions
on interbank lending, interest rates, and entry remain serious obstacles to efficient
financial intermediation.
  The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a model of financial
intermediation, leading to formal tests of efficient financial intermediation.  In Section 3,
we introduce China’s financial system and describe the main financial reforms.  The
empirical specification and tests are presented in Section 4, followed by discussion of4
data and estimation in sections 5 and 6.  Section 7 presents the results, Section 8 raises
several caveats, and section 9 concludes.
 
2.  Modeling Financial Intermediation
  Consider the problem of a bank or bank branch (b) located in region r lending to
different sectors of the economy (indexed by i).  The bank’s one-period maximization
problem can be expressed as follows:
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Income from each sector depends on the loan interest rate (r) and the expected
repayment rate on loans to that sector (Rrbi), which decreases as lending (Lrbi) increases.
The bank also is required by the government to make policy loans (Lrbg), which have an
expected repayment rate Rrbg.  The bank has two sources of funds--deposits (Drb), which
earn interest d, and net borrowing from the interbank market (Trb) at interest rate rt.  The
bank can demand or supply funds from or to the interbank market, so that Trb can be
positive or negative.  The bank takes all interest rates, the amount of deposits, and the
amount and expected repayment rate of policy loans as exogenous.  It chooses the
amount of lending to each sector and the amount of net borrowing from the interbank
market.  A balance condition equates the sources and uses of funds (2).5
  For commercial lending, the main difference between regions and banks is the
quality of loan projects, or the expected repayment rate on loans.  We posit that the
repayment rate is a linear function of economic fundamentals, including the sector’s size
(measured by share of output, qri), the sector’s rate of growth (gri) interacted with its size,
the overall level of development (output per capita—yr/popr), and the extent of financial
intermediation, or the amount of lending by the bank (Lrbi) and other banks in the sector
(Lrbi), normalized by sectoral output (qriyr):
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Here, all α i
n  are defined to have positive expectation.  Lending by other banks is taken as
exogenous.  As lending to the sector increases, good projects become harder to find and
the expected repayment rate falls.  The larger the sector and the faster it is growing, the
easier it is to find good projects for a given lending volume.  As described in the
introduction, regions with higher levels of development tend to have greater financing
requirements because of more input- and capital-intensive production activities.  If
different banks serve different client pools within the sector, the effect of loans from
other banks on repayment may be less than that of the bank’s own lending (α i
1>α i
2).
Efficient Intermediation
With a free interbank market, each bank can borrow or lend as much as it wants at
the interbank interest rate.  Lending to each sector in each province equates the marginal
expected return to the cost of interbank funds, which, if set to clear the market, leads to6
efficient allocation across sectors and provinces.  Substituting (3) into (1), dividing
through by yr, defining lrbi as the sectoral intermediation rate (Lrbi/qriyr), and solving the
integral and the first order conditions of the bank’s maximization problem yields the
following:
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The maximization problem of other banks can be solved analogously (to simplify we
assume there is only one other bank).  Optimal lending by each bank is a function of
lending by the other.  The two response functions determine a Nash equilibrium, yielding
a reduced form relationship between lrbi and the economic fundamentals.  The
responsiveness of lending will depend on the extent to which lending from the two banks
substitute for each other (formally, the α i
1s and α i
2s in each bank’s repayment function).
2
Assuming that the repayment functions of the two banks have identical coefficients, the
reduced form coefficients on fundamentals will equal those in (4) multiplied by κi, where
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2 Adding bank subscripts 1 and 2, the reduced form coefficients for bank 1’s lending are
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, where n is the n’th argument of the repayment function (3).7
At the extreme of no substitution, α i
2=0, κi =1 and lrbi is the same as equation (4),
excluding the first term on the right hand side.  As substitutability increases, α i
2
approaches α i
1 and κi approaches 0.5.
3  The responsiveness of lending to economic
fundamentals is reduced as the bank anticipates the lending behavior of the other bank,
and its effect on repayment rates.  Thus, measurable responsiveness to fundamentals
presumes market power.  However, the number of lenders will not affect the aggregate
responsiveness of lending to fundamentals, since total lending must equalize expected
return across regions in equilibrium.
4
An equation for region-bank-sector specific lending is estimable given sector-
specific data and under the assumption of efficient interbank markets.  Unfortunately, we
often only have data on total lending by the bank, with an unclear mapping between loan
categories and economic sectors.  Total loans of the bank are the sum of commercial
sectoral loans and policy loans, an identity which can be expressed in terms of
intermediation rates:
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Here, lrbg is policy loans divided by provincial output (Lrbg/yr).  Substituting yields the
following:
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3 The solution is indeterminate if there is perfect substitutability (α i
1=α i
2).  More generally, for n>2, κi will
converge to 1/n.
4 Market power does not reduce total lending because lending volume affects expected repayment for the
marginal loan only.  If  the endogeneity of repayment rates to lending volume is treated analogously to8
Intermediation with Fund Constraints
If the volume of interbank lending is restricted (TLrb<Trb<TUrb), where TLrb and
TUrb are lower and upper bounds, and the constraint binds (i.e., the bank would like to
borrow or lend more at the going interest rate), then the following identity must hold:
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If interbank constraints were identical for all banks in all provinces, then the quality of
loan projects would still affect lending amounts within the range of the bounds.  If, on the
other hand, interbank transfers were fully dictated by policy (i.e., TLrb=TUrb), then the
bank has no role in affecting the amount of lending and economic fundamentals become
irrelevant.
Of course, it is possible that the bounds themselves are responsive to economic
fundamentals if officials internalize the goal of efficient intermediation.  In the case of
efficient planning, planned transfers would be set equal to the market-determined
amounts and the outcome would be indistinguishable from the decentralized case.
However, officials may have other policy objectives.  Intermediation could even be
inversely related to economic fundamentals if prosperous areas are taxed to finance
policy lending elsewhere.  Absent a free interbank market, intermediation outcomes
depend on the specific alternative mechanisms enabling funds to move across regions.
                                                                                                                                                
price endogeneity, the monopolist can perfectly discriminate.  Thus, market power will not affect lending
decisions in aggregate, nor undermine efficiency of resource allocation, assuming correct price signals.9
We can model the transfer bounds as a function of economic fundamentals, policy
variables, and deposits:
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Inclusion of deposits captures the idea that the government may tax banks with high
deposit levels by adjusting transfer bounds.  In such cases, more deposits do not
necessarily translate into an ability to make more loans.  Substituting (9) into (8) yields
the following expression for lending when transfer bounds are binding:
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This equation contains two variables that do not appear in the lending equation assuming
efficient intermediation (7)—provincial policy loans (Lrg/yr), which include policy loans
not lent by the bank itself (Lrbg/yr), and the amount of deposits in the bank (Drb/yr).
Measuring the effect of these variables on lending thus is a natural test for efficient
intermediation.  For example, lending by a rural bank could be influenced by the size of
the state-owned sector even if the rural bank does not lend directly to that sector.  Also,
with free interbank lending, lending amounts should depend on economic fundamentals
and not be influenced by the amount of own deposits.  A strong effect of deposits on
lending is thus indicative of inefficient intermediation, but the lack of an effect is not
evidence of efficient intermediation because it may reflect a government policy of fully10
taxing surplus deposits (trb
6=-1).  To the extent that the effect of economic fundamentals
on lending may be of opposite sign in (7) and (10), the sign of the coefficients on
economic variables become an additional test.
These tests examine financial intermediation across provinces.  Even if inter-
provincial intermediation is inefficient, we also may be interested in assessing
intermediation within provinces.  If there were no financial flows among provinces but
unrestricted flows within provinces, provincial policy loans should affect lending volume
by all institutions.  This also may be true if intra-provincial flows are restricted, so the
effect of provincial policy loans on lending cannot be used to test for the efficiency of
intra-provincial intermediation.  A more promising approach is to test the effect of
savings in other provincial banks on bank lending.  If the interbank market within the
province is free, lending by any one bank should be affected by total deposits in the
province rather than the bank’s own deposits.
 
3. Financial Intermediation in China
China’s financial system is dominated by four state “specialized” banks and three
policy banks.  In 1997 these accounted for two thirds of total deposits and three fourths of
lending (Table 1).  Established in the early 1980s, the specialized banks took over the
lending responsibilities of the socialist monobank, each focusing on a specific sector--
industry and commerce, agriculture, construction, and foreign currency transactions.
Despite reform efforts to commercialize these banks and promote greater competition,
policy lending, mainly to state-owned enterprises, without doubt has accounted for a
significant proportion of specialized bank lending in China.  Lardy (1998), citing Chinese
sources, estimates that 42 percent of specialized bank loans in 1991 were policy loans.11
The three policy banks were established in 1994 to separate policy from commercial
lending.  However, their share of total loans extended by the banking system was only 16
percent in 1997, suggesting that substantial policy lending, especially to state-owned
enterprises, continues through the specialized banks.
5
Financial institutions other than state banks include rural credit cooperatives, or
RCCs (13 percent of deposits, 10 percent of loans), national and regional commercial
banks (10 percent of deposits, 5 percent of loans), urban credit cooperatives and urban
cooperative banks (7 and 5 percent respectively), and national trust-and investment
companies.
6  The RCCs, the only financial institutions with a branch network extending
to villages, are under the administrative supervision of the state banking system
(currently the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and before 1996, the Agricultural Bank of
China), lend mainly to farmers and rural enterprises, and have no national headquarters to
directly intermediate funds across provinces.  Other financial institutions (OFIs) in
general are more recently established (dating from the late 1980s), are located in richer
regions, tend to lend more funds to the non-state sector and have grown rapidly in recent
years.  OFIs are subject to central bank reserve requirements but do not have access to
central bank refinancing.
The efficiency of financial intermediation depends on the specific mechanisms
that facilitate financial flows across regions.  In China, there are three main channels:
central bank fund allocation, mainly through relending by the People’s Bank of China;
                                                
5 The State Development Bank of China (SDB) finances large infrastructure projects, the Agricultural
Development Bank of China (ADBC) provides working capital for the procurement of agricultural
commodities, and the Export-Import Bank of China provides export credit particularly for enterprises in the
shipbuilding, machinery and electronics industries.  The policy banks do not take deposits but finance their
loans via central bank re-lending or by issuing bonds.
6 Our data does not include other financial institutions such as regional trust and investment companies,
finance companies, rural cooperative funds (RCFs), rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs, or
hui), inter-enterprise finance, and other informal financial organizations.12
reallocation of funds among provincial branches of national banks (within-bank
transfers), and the interbank market.  Financial reforms in the 1990s affected all three of
these channels.
7  We discuss briefly six policy changes and their anticipated effects on
inter-regional financial flows.  The changes are summarized in Table 2.
1. Guidance versus binding enforcement of credit plans
Although production and distribution plans gradually lost their importance in the
mid-1980’s, annual national credit plans have continued to be a key determinant of inter-
regional fund allocation.  Based on consultation with provincial government leaders and
managers of national banks, the State Planning Commission determined credit targets for
each bank branch in each province.  The plans gave primacy to policy lending goals
(often linked to specific projects), but also internalized distributional and efficiency
considerations.  When strictly enforced, the plans left little room for bank managers to
adjust total lending amounts, either through within-bank transfers or interbank lending.
During different periods, credit plan targets either have been enforced as
“binding” (zhilingxing) or have been understood to provide only “guidance”
(zhidaoxing).  Binding enforcement has occurred during policy retrenchment periods to
combat inflation and reduce excessive total lending.  These periods also have been
associated with sharply reduced lending to the non-state sector (Brandt and Zhu,
forthcoming) and strong efforts to reduce unlawful diversion of funds from policy to
                                                
7 The financial reforms of the mid-1990s were designed to improve the quality of loan portfolios and
improve monetary control.  They began with what became known as Zhu Rongji’s “16 point program” in
July 1993 which contained emergency measures aimed at reducing inflation.  The December 1993 State
Council "Decision on Reform of the Financial System" was the blueprint for the financial reforms instituted
the following year, including the establishment of policy banks.  This was followed by the promulgation of
a new Central Bank Law (March 18, 1995) and a new Commercial Bank Law (May 5, 1995).13
commercial lending.  In the 1990s, binding enforcement occurred during the high
inflation period beginning in late 1993 and extending through 1994.
8
2. Centralization of PBC relending
In order to help finance shortfalls between loans and deposits the central bank has
maintained a system of re-lending (zaidaikuan).  Officially these funds are earmarked for
specific purposes, such as procurement of agricultural goods, support for large and
medium-size SOEs, disaster relief etc. (Luo, 1991; Xie, 1996).  Relending supports credit
plan targets by providing low-interest loans to bank branches that have “quota but no
funds.”  Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, PBC relending refinanced about 30
percent of the specialized banks’ loans, reaching almost 40 percent in 1993 (calculated
from PBC, various years).
Until 1994 the vast majority of PBC relending--up to 70 percent according to
some estimates--was channeled through the PBC’s local branches at the provincial level
and below (Xie, 1996).
9  Decisions by managers of these branches were often influenced
by local government officials who controlled their promotion and other benefits (Sehrt,
1999).  This led to excessive lending that contributed to inflationary pressures.  To
combat this problem, in May 1994 local PBC branches were prohibited from re-lending
to specialized bank branches in their locale (PBC, 1994c).  The PBC instead directed
refinancing to the national headquarters of specialized or policy banks, which distributed
them to local branches based on approved plans.  Local branches thus had to appeal to
                                                
8China experienced three austerity periods between the mid-1980’s and mid-90’s corresponding with
inflation peaks in 1985, 1988 and 1993/4. The boom-bust cycles of China’s reform experience are widely
recognized (Compare Fan and Woo, 1993; Yusuf, 1994; Naughton, 1995; World Bank, 1995; Huang,
1996).
9 Officially, PBC refinancing at the local level was only intended to help banks cover temporary shortages
in funds. However, the balance sheets of local PBC branches reflect that throughout the late 1980’s and
early 1990’s at least 50 percent of PBC re-lending extended at the provincial level and below were loans
with a duration of one year or above (Compare HJPBC, 1996; ZPBC, 1997).14
their headquarters for additional funds, rather than, with the help of local government
officials, pressuring local PBC branches to extend more funds.  If previous excessive
lending primarily supported politically desired projects of local officials, then centralized
relending should have strengthened the commercial basis of lending.  If lending was
based on economic criteria, the opposite could be true.
3. Shift to ratio loan management
Reforms in 1994 changed the method for determining approved credit volume of
specialized banks.  Instead of the previous system of administrative targets (guimo
guanli) approved credit volume was based on a maximum ratio between loans and
deposits (bili guanli) (PBC, 1994b).
10  The ratios applied to total national lending by
individual banks, but allowed the headquarters to alter the credit allocation for specific
provinces.  This change should have provided specialized banks with greater flexibility to
use within-bank transfers to adjust interregional fund allocation, presumably to pursue
commercial lending goals.
4. Improved managerial incentives and prudent financial regulation
The new Commercial Bank Law that came into effect in 1995 contained measures
to improve managerial profit incentives and the quality of bank loan portfolios.
11  These
                                                
10 In line with Basel international banking standards, the average of total loans at the end of each ten day
period cannot exceed 75 percent of the average of total deposits during that time period. The ratio
management applies to all domestic commercial banks as well as foreign joint venture banks. The four
specialized banks which had much higher loan-deposit ratios were given two years to conform to these
standards.  For the four specialized banks the average total of new loans at the end of ten day period cannot
exceed 75 percent of the average total new  deposits during that time period(PBC, 1994b). It is questionable
whether the specialized banks are actually conforming to these ratios. Although there is evidence that since
1994 the ratio of new loans to new deposits of the specialized banks has been below the 75 percent limit
(Xie, 1997), the ratios of outstanding loans to total deposits, remain well above the Basle standards.
11 The 1994 legislation established capital adequacy ratios in line with international standards.  Overdue
loans cannot exceed eight percent of total loans, non-performing loans cannot exceed five percent and bad
loans cannot exceed two percent of total loans measured as average balance at the end of each month.
Additional provisions limit the exposure to large customers.  Loans to any one customer cannot exceed 15
percent of the banks total capital.  Loans to the banks largest ten customers cannot exceed 50 percent of the15
changes should have improved the responsiveness of lending to economic fundamentals
by constraining the ability of banks to make unprofitable policy-driven loans.
5. Establishment of policy banks
The establishment of policy banks, a process completed by the end of 1994, was
intended to reduce incentive conflicts associated with mixing policy and commercial
objectives.  By far the largest policy bank, and the only one established in all provinces
(and in many counties), was the Agricultural Development Bank of China.  Over 90
percent of ADBC loans were for procurement of agricultural commodities, mostly grain.
It was hoped that separation would prevent diversion of policy loans to more profitable
lending activity, on the one hand, and free specialized banks to focus on commercial
lending without being burdened by policy responsibilities (diversion in the opposite
direction), on the other.  Whether lending becomes more or less policy (versus
commercially) oriented depends on the direction of previous diversion.  It is also possible
that separation could increase overall responsiveness to both policy variables and
fundamentals.
6. Reopening of the interbank market
In order to increase capital mobility between banks and across regions, and to
help decrease the banks’ reliance on PBC re-financing, in 1986 the PBC permitted all
banking institutions to lend and borrow funds on local interbank markets.  By the end of
1987 there were 360 interbank markets operating nationwide (PBC, 1988).  There is
evidence that these markets were quite active in the early 1990s.  Many bank branches,
even at the county and township levels, lent funds directly to branches in other provinces.
                                                                                                                                                
banks total capital.  Loans to stockholders cannot exceed 100 percent of the total amount of the
stockholder's paid in capital (PBC, 1994b).16
In 1993 at least RMB 100 billion were lent by the specialized banks to non-bank financial
institutions, mainly trust and investment companies, or TICs (PBC, 1994a).
12
The possibility that large but unmonitored inter-regional transactions were leading
to substantial outflows from the formal banking system, thus undermining the
effectiveness of the credit plan, prompted policy-makers in the second half of 1993 to
suspend most interbank market activities.  With the exception of trading centers run by
PBC branches in 35 cities for short-term borrowing and lending, all interbank market
centers were shut down.
A new, national unified interbank market was opened in Shanghai in January
1996.  The new market is much more tightly controlled than the one which had existed in
1993.  Access to the market is reserved for the national headquarters of specialized banks
and PBC branches in 35 cities.  Interbank lending is limited to short-term transactions
(maximum of four months).  Thus, bank branches are no longer able to trade
independently but must depend on their headquarters to adjust their supply of funds
(PBC, 1994b; Wang and Yang, 1996; PBC Department for Monetary Policy, 1997).
Other financial institutions such as the headquarters of national and regional commercial
banks as well as Urban Cooperative Banks in principle also have access to the national
interbank market.
Reform and Performance of Chinese Financial Institutions
Most of the financial reforms were implemented from mid-1994 to mid-1995, and
all had the potential to increase the commercial orientation of the banking system.  We
roughly divide the 1991-1997 period into pre-reform (1991-94) and post-reform (1995-
                                                
12 Compare TIC balance sheets in (PBC, various years).17
97) periods despite the fact that the timing of a few reforms do not fit well with this
division.  First, two retrenchment policies began in 1993—binding enforcement of credit
plans and suspension of interbank trading—that hurt commercialization in the middle of
the pre-reform period.  Second, the re-establishment of the interbank market did not
occur until January 1996, well into the post-reform period.  The timing of these reforms
may qualify our interpretation of the empirical analysis, but broadly speaking the post-
reform period should have been much more commercialized if the intended reforms were
implemented successfully.  Evidence on the effect of “oddly” timed reforms also may
appear in annual regression results.
The effect of reforms on financial performance may have differed by financial
institution.  The strongest effects should be seen in the performance of state specialized
and policy banks, which were directly affected by all six policy changes.  The effect of
policy bank establishment should be especially pronounced for the Agricultural Bank of
China (ABC), China’s second largest specialized bank in 1993, which spun off the
country’s largest policy bank, the ADBC.  The ADBC’s loan portfolio was nearly the
same size as that of the ABC by 1997 (Table 1).  The ABC is also unique in being the
only specialized bank to negotiate a fixed rent profit-sharing contract with the center as
early as 1988, which could have made managerial profit incentives stronger than in other
banks.
The rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) and other financial institutions (OFIs) were
not affected by all of the financial reforms.  For instance, PBC relending and policy
banks had no relevance for the decisions of RCCs and OFIs.  RCCs, because of their
organizational structure and local lending orientation, are likely to lend in regionally
segmented markets and so may not be strongly affected by the shift to ratio planning or18
restrictions on the interbank market.  On the other hand, they may have been affected by
the shift in oversight from the ABC to the PBC in 1996, which resulted in lower reserve
requirements and more hands-off regulatory oversight.  This may have reduced the effect
of policy lending on fund availability.  For OFIs, on the other hand, the interbank market
(legal or illegal) may have been an important source or outlet for funds.  OFIs, because of
their focus on the non-state sector, also may have suffered particularly from binding
enforcement of credit plans.
4.  Empirical Specification and Tests
  The main estimating equation is the following:
LY ISH AG ISH IG ISH l rt rt rt rt rt rbt 4 3 2 1 ) 1 ( * * β β β β + − + + = (11)
t r rt rt rt rt rt rt TD BD SOEY SOEP SOEY GRAIN δ λ β β β β β + + + + + + + 9 8 7 6 5 *
The economy is divided into two sectors--industrial (or non-agricultural) and agricultural
(or non-industrial), denoted by I and A.  Four variables describe the economic
fundamentals:  ISH is the industrial/non-agricultural share of output, IG and AG are
sectoral growth rates, which are interacted with sector shares, and LY is the log of output
per capita.  The three policy variables are GRAIN (grain production normalized by total
output), SOEY (output of state-owned industry normalized by total output), and SOEP
(SOE profits as a share of assets), which is interacted with the size of the SOE sector.
BD is the bank’s deposits normalized by total output (BDEP for state banks, ADEP for
the ABC/ADBC, RDEP for RCCs, and ODEP for OFIs), and TD is total provincial19
deposits from all financial institutions.  The last two terms are provincial and year
unobservables.
Before discussing the data and estimation, we  review briefly the interpretation of
the coefficients on different variable groups.
 
Policy Lending
  The effect of policy variables (GRAIN, SOEY, or SOEP) on bank lending has
two possible implications for efficient financial intermediation.  First, if the bank itself is
responsible for the policy lending, policy lending can crowd out commercial lending.
13
However, net of policy lending, intermediation may still be efficient if policy loans act
like a fixed tax and lending responds to economic fundamentals.  Second, if the bank is
not responsible for the policy lending (for example, RCCs do not generally lend to
SOEs), the effect of a policy variable on lending is prima facie evidence that transfer
bounds are affected by policy variables.
 
Economic Fundamentals
  In a commercial system, financial intermediation should increase with the level of
industrialization, the rate of economic growth (in all sectors), and the overall level of
development.
14  The extent to which lending by individual banks responds to
fundamentals increases with market power.  Lending by aggregations of banks should
respond to fundamentals even in competitive markets.  Even with significant policy
lending, if at the margin funds are allowed to flow to their most productive use, lending
                                                
13 At the national level, central financing still must crowd out commercial lending or become unsustainable.
14 Firms in rapidly growing areas also may be more able to finance activities from retained earnings, but
China’s low official interest rates make loan financing highly desirable.20
should respond positively to fundamentals after controlling for policy factors.  However,
if the government taxes richer, faster growing areas and controls the allocation of
resources across regions, intermediation may be inversely related to economic
fundamentals.
 
Deposits and Lending
  With a free interbank market, loans should be made based on economic
fundamentals without regard to the source of deposits.  Thus, greater influence of own
deposits on lending implies market segmentation and less efficient intermediation.  If the
interbank market is free within a province but not across provinces, lending should be
affected by total deposits in the province, but not own deposits.
  
5.  Data
Data are from published sources, including various issues of the Statistical
Yearbook of China, the China Rural Economics Statistical Yearbook, the China Rural
Financial Statistics Yearbook, the Agricultural Yearbook of China, China Almanac of
Banking and Finance, and China Provincial Statistics During 20 Years of Economic
Reform.  For state banks and OFIs, complete data is available for 1991-97, and for the
ABC/ADBC and RCCs, data is available for 1991-96.
For intermediation by state banks and OFIs, output (Y) is measured by GDP, I
refers to industrial GDP, and A refers to non-industrial GDP.  For intermediation by the
ABC/ADBC and the RCC, output is measured by rural social output value, I refers to
nonagricultural rural social output value, and A refers to agricultural output value.  State-
owned enterprise output is measured by SOE industrial output value.  Data on rural social21
output value in 1995 is not available and is interpolated to be the mean of the previous
and subsequent years for each province.  All values are adjusted to 1996 yuan using
provincial consumer price indices.
 
6.  Estimation
It is straightforward to estimate the intermediation equation for individual banks
or aggregations of banks.  We estimate (11) for 4 definitions of b: state banks, the
ABC/ADBC, RCCs, and OFIs .  For each definition we include the bank’s own deposits
as well as total deposits in all financial institutions.  Regions (r) are provinces in China,
excluding the municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai), Tibet, and Guangxi.
15
  The main estimation results are from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
models of intermediation rates for the four bank definitions.  We estimate within and
between estimates, allowing the within estimates to differ by period through the inclusion
of period interaction terms, and controlling for national changes by including year
dummies.  The 1991-97 period is divided into two periods—1991-94 and 1995-97.  We
also run annual regressions, which are reported in Appendix Tables 4-7.  The SUR model
increases the precision of estimates by exploiting possible error correlation across the
equations for different banks.  Hausman tests reject random effects in all cases.
  
7. Results
                                                
15 Municipalities are excluded because they are extreme outliers for variables such as output per capita,
rural social output value per capita, deposits, and intermediation rates.  For example, including municipal
provinces in the intermediation-GDP per capita regressions yields destroys the clear negative trend in the
data seen in Figure 1.  Tibet and Guangxi are excluded because of missing data.22
Descriptive
  The striking inverse relationship between the rate of financial intermediation and
the level of economic development among Chinese provinces suggests that factors other
than economic fundamentals play an important role in lending decisions.  China’s richest
and fastest growing coastal provinces (Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong) had the
lowest state bank intermediation rates during 1991-97 while provinces with higher
intermediation rates tended to be those with greater SOE output relative to GDP, and with
less profitable SOEs (Appendix Tables 1 and 2).  For state banks, the negative
intermediation trend became statistically significant beginning in 1994 and worsened to a
low elasticity of intermediation with respect to GDP per capita of –0.42 in 1997 (Table
3).  For the ABC/ADBC the elasticities were even more negative, perhaps reflecting their
rural focus, but for RCCs they have been only slightly negative and not statistically
significant (Table 3).  In contrast, intermediation by OFIs is strongly positively related to
the level of development.  This suggests that OFIs are helping to meet credit demand in
areas where official state banks are underproviding credit.
Estimation
Table 5 reports the main estimation results.  We discuss separately the results for
all state banks, ABC/ADBC, RCCs, and OFIs, in each case assessing the different tests of
efficient intermediation associated with different variables--policy lending, economic
fundamentals, and deposits.
State Banks
Policy objectives clearly play an important role in financial lending decisions in
China.  Reforms attempted to reduce policy influence on lending.  However, the within23
estimates suggest that a one yuan increase in SOE output value increased lending by 0.28
yuan in period 1 (1991-94) and 0.30 yuan in period 2 (1995-1997).  The between estimate
is similar (but statistically insignificant), and also reveals that a one yuan decrease in
profits per 100 yuan assets increases the responsiveness of lending to SOE output by
0.01.  In annual regressions, the effects of SOE output and profits increase steadily over
time, reaching their highest values in 1997 (Appendix Table 3).  This suggests that
China’s SOE policy lending problem did not abate despite announced reforms and may
even have increased.  Part of this may be due to the steady erosion of SOE profitability
despite declines in SOE output per capita since 1993 (Table 4).
16
The coefficients on the economic fundamentals are mostly insignificant and
frequently of the wrong sign, suggesting that the regional allocation of resources through
the state banking system does not respond to economic signals, even after controlling for
factors affecting policy lending.  The within estimates show that higher output is strongly
associated with lower levels of intermediation, and that this inverse relationship is
stronger in the post-reform period, a change that is statistically significant.  However, the
between estimate reveals a slightly positive (but statistically insignificant) relationship, so
that after controlling for covariates, the 1997 negative cross-sectional relationship of
Figure 1 is not evidenced for provincial means.  The only other statistically significant
result is a negative coefficient on industrial growth for the between estimate.  Within
estimates for industrial growth are negative, more negative in the post-reform period (not
significant), but much smaller than the between estimates.  In annual regressions, the
negative coefficient on industrial growth only becomes statistically significant (and much
larger) in 1997.  Similarly, industrial share of income becomes significantly negative only
                                                
16 We defer discussion of policy lending for grain to the section on ABC/ADBCs.24
in the last 2 years (it is slightly positive but not significant in the main estimation results,
both for within and between estimates)  The coefficient on agricultural growth is of
mixed signs but not statistically significant.  Overall, there appears to be a worsening, if
anything, of performance in the post-reform period.
The effect of state bank deposits on lending is near zero and insignificant pre-
reform and 0.34 and significant post-reform (within estimates) and very large and
significant in cross-section (between estimate greater than 1).  Annual regressions show
that very high coefficients on deposits obtain from 1992 to 1995, but that there is a
substantial reduction (less than half) in 1996 and 1997, corresponding to the period when
interbank market mechanisms were reintroduced.  The coefficient on total provincial
deposits is significantly negative in the years when deposit coefficients are large and
positive (they are also negative in the between and post-reform within estimates).  This
suggests poor intermediation across institutions within provinces.  Deposits in other
institutions appear to result in more loans from competing institutions which crowd out
own lending.   
ABC/ADBC
  The main policy lending responsibility for the ABC/ADBC is grain procurement
loans.  For the ABC/ADBC, the coefficients on GRAIN have similar relative magnitudes
but are much larger than for all banks.  The between estimate (634) is much larger than
the within estimates (251 and148).  There is a reduction in the coefficient size in the post-
reform period (and it is no longer significant), but in annual regressions, the coefficient
on grain grows steadily over time, reaching a peak of 1834 in 1997.  The grain coefficient
can be interpreted as the amount of lending associated with one additional ton of grain
production.  The size of the coefficients are extremely high when one considers that in25
1996, a ton of grain cost about 1200 yuan
17 and China’s grain bureaus only procure about
20 percent of production on average.  Two possible explanations for the large grain
coefficients are that procurement as a share of output increases with output and that much
of the value is unrecoverable debt, which reportedly accounts for 40 percent of ADBC
outstanding loans (Liu, 1998).
18  In recent years, ADBC outstanding loans have increased
rapidly (33 and 38 percent in 1996 and 1997) despite modest increases in grain output,
low grain prices, and reduced procurement quotas (ADBC, 1998).  This is consistent with
the poor within-province correlation between lending and grain output in the post-reform
period.  Separation of policy and commercially may have weakened the enforcement of
policy loan repayment.  The estimates also provide evidence that ABCs lend more where
SOE output is high, although the magnitudes are much smaller than for all state banks.
  The responsiveness of ABC/ADBC lending to economic fundamentals is similar
to that for all banks, but with more mixed results.  Log output per capita is significantly
positive in the between estimation and for all years in annual regressions.  Agricultural
growth also has a significant positive coefficient in the between estimation and in some
years of the annual regression.  Also, as for all banks, deposits have a larger effect on
lending in the post-reform within estimate (0.839) and an even greater effect in the
between estimate (1.084).  In annual regressions, there is a sharp drop in the deposit
coefficient in 1994, the year when the ADBC was established.  This may reflect a formal
break in deposit financing of policy lending (ADBC loans are financed almost entirely by
PBC relending).  The negative coefficient on total provincial deposits might be explained
by the same argument used above.
                                                
17 Procurement prices in 1996 were 1.06 yuan/kg for maize, 1.31 yuan/kg for wheat, and 1.33 yuan/kg for
paddy rice.26
 Beginning in 1994, it is possible to look separately at lending by ABC and
ADBC branches (Table 6).  Within estimates for the 1994-96 period reveal that ABC
branches responded positively to industrial share and industrial growth, consistent with
the increasing proportion of loans going to township and village enterprises (almost 20
percent in 1996).  However, all three policy variables are significant, suggesting that
ABCs continue to support grain procurement and SOEs (these effects are much more
significant than in the pooled result).  In 1995, procurement loans by the ABC were about
25 percent that of the ADBC.  ADBC intermediation rates show a negative response to
industrial share and agricultural growth, revealing no responsiveness to fundamentals.
However, the grain coefficient is not significant, consistent with the interpretation that the
surge in outstanding loans may be due less to grain procurement needs than problems of
loan diversion and failed repayment of earlier loans.  SOE variables are also insignificant.
In annual regressions, ADBC lending appears positively associated with industrial
growth and economic output, suggesting that repayment problems may be greater in
richer areas where the incentive to divert funds is greater.  The annual regressions also
show grain becoming more significant for ADBCs and less significant for ABC branches
over time, as would be expected.
RCCs
The RCCs appear to be isolated institutions not well-integrated into national
financial markets nor overly influenced by policy lending goals.  Between estimates and
annual regressions produce statistically significant coefficients only for own deposits
(0.813 between estimate).   Turning to the within estimates, RCCs tend to intermediate
more when areas become more industrial (positive and increasing within estimates).  The
                                                                                                                                                
18 Such lending is plausible since the ABC has branch offices in major cities, and is the primarily lender to27
RCCs also appear to loan more in provinces with greater SOE output, perhaps because
loans diverted to SOEs by other banks no longer compete with the RCCs own portfolio.
Other Financial Institutions
The other financial institutions appear to be more commercially oriented, but just
as for other institutions, lending is increasingly affected by own deposits over time.  Both
the level of output and the rate of industrial growth have positive coefficients in the
between and within estimates, and in almost all years.  The elasticity of intermediation
with respect to GDP per capita is relatively small (0.034-0.078) but precisely estimated.
Industrial growth has an especially pronounced effect in the post-reform period.  There
are, however, significant negative coefficients for industrial income share in the post-
reform period, and agricultural growth in the pre-reform period.  There are also some
unanticipated effects of policy variables (grain and SOE profitability in the first period)
which might reflect government influence in lending decisions by OFIs.  In annual
regressions, none of the policy variables is consistently significant across time.  Deposits
affect lending more in the second period, with the within and between estimates very
high (0.55 and 0.89, and 0.70).  The annual regressions show that high deposit
coefficients begin after closure of the interbank market in 1993 but do not return to lower
levels after 1995 as in other banks.  This suggests that OFIs  have not had full access to
the new national interbank market.  In addition, they may have been scrutinized more
closely by central bank officials on adherence of the newly established minimum loan-to-
deposit ratios.
 
8.  Caveats
                                                                                                                                                
agroindustry.28
Overdue Loans
Our measure of financial intermediation is based on outstanding loans, which can
overestimate the extent of true financial intermediation if a large share of loans are
overdue and non-performing.
19  Bad loans have been estimated to account for 20 percent
of outstanding loans of state banks (Lardy, 1998), and could be higher if loans are rolled
over and not categorized as overdue.  Overdue loans should decrease with better
economic fundamentals, possibly leading us to underestimate the response of new lending
to fundamentals.  However, much of the possible bias from non-repayment should be
picked up by the policy variables, especially SOE profitability.  Agricultural policy loan
repayment problems are less due to cyclical factors than structural incentive problems
(Park and Rozelle, 1998).  Overdue loans may also reflect the past history of economic
fundamentals and policy lending, but our data is insufficient to identify such a rich lagged
structure.
20  Some of this history may be picked up by the provincial fixed effects.  To the
extent that new policy loans are highly serially correlated because they are linked to past
policy lending commitments, the coefficient on policy variables will overestimate their
effect on new lending.  But this bias is of independent interest and has similar
implications for performance.  In this case, the policy variables will also better absorb the
bias from omitted past economic and policy variables.  Even if bias from overdue loans
remains, the test results at the very least provide evidence on the extent to which the
overdue problem overwhelms (possibly efficient) new loan allocation in affecting overall
lending portfolios.
                                                
19 Outstanding loans also may reflect loans in previous years rather than the most recent year if loans have a
duration that exceeds one year.  In China, the vast majority of loans are short-term (70 percent of new loans
in 1997 had a duration of one year or less).
20 The high R-squared values also suggest that most of the variation is explained by current-period
covariates.29
Endogeneity of Intermediation and Growth
  The difficulty of identifying causal direction in the positive association between
financial development and economic growth is a well-known problem (Levine and
Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  A positive effect of financial intermediation on
growth may lead to an upward bias in our estimates of the effect of economic
fundamentals on lending.  This possible bias, however, only strengthens our findings that
many economic fundamentals do not appear to influence the level of financial
intermediation.  As a robustness check, we re-estimate the within estimates by
instrumenting the economic fundamentals by their lagged values and also by regressing
directly on the lagged values instead of contemporaneous values.  The former assumes
that lagged values do not belong in the intermediation equation, the latter that loans are
based on past rather than expected future performance or capture an arguably exogenous
part of expected outcomes.  These alternative estimates for the most part do not alter the
main results in terms of the signs of coefficients or changes between the two periods
(Appendix Table 4).
21
 
Omission of Other Intermediaries
Our dataset excludes some financial intermediaries, such as regional trust and
investment companies, finance companies, rural cooperative funds (RCFs), rotating
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), inter-enterprise finance, and other informal
                                                
21 Estimates as expected reveal an upward bias on coefficients of many economic fundamentals.
Coefficients changing from positive to negative include industrial share of income (state banks, both
periods, lagged and 3SLS estimates) and log output per capita (OFI, both periods, 3SLS estimate); those
changing from negative to positive include agricultural growth (state banks, period 1, lagged and 3SLS
estimates).30
lending institutions.  We do not expect these unmeasured activities to be very large.
Nonetheless, it is possible that other financial intermediaries assume larger roles in more
developed areas, or that various informal or even illegal mechanisms funds channel funds
to their most valued use.  Our results strictly speaking assess only performance by the
institutions for which we have data rather than the overall financial system.  Nonetheless,
in a country where formal financial institutions control such a vast amount of resources,
we expect their performance to have large aggregate effects on economic growth.
9.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed empirical tests of financial intermediation based
on a model of profit maximization by banks and restrictions on interbank lending.  The
tests focus on the effect of policy variables, economic fundamentals, and deposits on
rates of financial intermediation.  We have applied these tests to Chinese data, but they
have much wider potential application.
The results suggest that financial intermediation in China is far from efficient and
that financial reforms in the mid-1990s have not reversed a worsening trend.  The
responsiveness of lending to policy concerns such as SOE output and profitability and
grain production is significant and has increased, if anything, in the recent period.
Economic fundamentals have had little effect on total lending, but there is evidence that
for the specific case of the ABC and ADBC, separation of policy and commercial lending
has allowed the ABC to become more commercially oriented, even though it still
responds to policy variables as well.  Such separation does not improve overall
performance, with the ADBC incurring increasing losses from policy lending.  Among
other financial institutions, RCCs seem poorly integrated into financial markets,31
suggesting potentially large gains from integrating RCCs into the national banking
system.  The small but rapidly growing group of other financial institutions (Urban
Cooperatives and Cooperative Banks, national and regional commercial banks, and
national TICs), are most commercial in their orientation and likely have filled important
credit demand niches.
Despite greater rhetoric about the need for financial reform, the performance of
banks appears to have worsened, if anything in recent years.  This does not necessarily
mean that reforms have been ineffective or unnecessary.  They may reflect continued
difficulty in dealing with the huge portfolio problems facing Chinese banks, so that
despite stronger incentives to improve allocation of new loans, the sharply deteriorating
performance of SOEs and the portfolio of older loans is overwhelming these efforts.
After 1997, reforms continued.  In 1998, provincial PBC branches were abolished in
favor of multi-province regional branches and the government announced that the
national credit plan would be eliminated in 1999.  Banks have been allowed to adjust
their branch structures based on commercial considerations rather than having a branch at
each administrative level.  Each specialized bank has established an asset management
company to salvage as much value as possible from non-performing loans.  All of these
changes will continue to move China toward a more commercial banking system.
However, while growth of OFIs and continued reform of specialized banks holds promise
for future performance, the limited and highly regulated interbank market, government-
set interest rates, centralization of financial management, and continued difficulty
resolving the SOE problem continue to be major impediments to efficient inter-regional
resource flows.32
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Figure 1
Log(All Bank Financial Intermediation Rate) and Log(GDP per Capita),
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Note: excludes municipal provinces (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai), and Tibet.36
Table 1
Deposits and Loan Shares of China’s Financial Institutions, 1997
Deposits Loans
State Banks
Specialized Banks 65% 62%
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 28% 26%
Agricultural Bank of China 14% 13%
Bank of China 7% 7%
China Construction Bank 16% 15%
Policy Banks 0% 16%
Agricultural Development Bank of China 0% 11%
State Development Bank of China 0% 5%
Export-Import Bank 0% 0%
Other Financial Institutions* 35% 22%
Rural Credit Cooperatives 13% 10%
National Commercial Banks** 8% 4%
Regional Commercial Banks*** 2% 1%
Urban Credit Cooperatives/Urban Coop. Banks 7% 5%
Postal Savings 3%
National Trust-and Investment Companies 1% 1%
Source:  Calculated from (PBC, 1998) and the banks’ annual reports.
* Excluded institutions include regional trust-and investment companies and finance
companies which are estimated to account for three percent of the national total for both
loans and deposits.   Also excluded are rural cooperative funds (RCFs), rotating savings
and credit associations (ROSCAS), interenterprise finance, and other informal lending
institutions.
** National commercial banks include the Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial
Bank, Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, the China Investment Bank, Zhaoshang Bank and
Minsheng Bank.
*** Regional commercial banks include Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen
Development Bank, Fujian Xingye Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and
Hainan Development Bank.37
Table 2
Financial Reform Summary, 1991-97
Policy reform 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
1. Guidance (not binding)
credit plans
yes yes no
(July)
no yes yes yes
2. Centralized PBC relending no no no yes
(June)
yes yes yes
3. Ratio loan management no no no yes
(Feb)
yes yes yes
4. Commercial Bank Law
Improved managerial
incentives
no no no No yes
(May)
yes yes
5. Policy banks established no no no yes
(Dec.)
yes yes yes
6. Open interbank market yes yes no
(July)
no no yes yes
*Policy banks established gradually throughout the year.  ADBCs established mostly in
late 1994.
Notes and sources for reform dates:
1.  Zhu Rongji’s 16 point program.
2.  Announced May 9
th, implemented June 21
st.  PBC (1994). "Zhongguo renmin
yinhang, Zhongguo gongshang yinhang, Zhongguo nongye yinhang, Zhongguo
yinhang, Zhongguo renmin jianshe yinhang guanyu zuo hao Zhongguo renmin
yinhang fenzhe hang yuanfafang de zaidaikuan huazhuan gongzuo de tongzhi; Yinfa
(1994) no. 43." in 1994 nian xindai zijin guanli wenjian huibian (ed.) Beijing:
Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe (1995): pg. 92 - 98.
3.  Announced February 15
th, implemented later in the year.  PBC (1994). "Zhongguo
renmin yinhang guanyu dui shangye yinhang fuzhai bili guanli de tongzhi; Yinfa
(1994) no. 38." in 1994  nian jinrong guizhang zhidu xuanbian. PBC (ed.) Beijing:
Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe. Vol. 1: pg. 25-31.
4.  Zhongguo renmin gongheguo shangye yinhangfa.” In in PBC (1996). 1995  nian
jinrong guizhang zhidu xuanbian. Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, pg. 8
ff.
5.  Policy banks established gradually beginning mid-year.  SDB established April 14th,
Import-Export Bank established on July 1
st, and ADBC branches established mostly
in late 1994.  PBC (1995). Zhongguo jinrong nianjian 1995. Beijing: Zhongguo
jinrong chubanshe, pg.145.
6.  PBC Department for Monetary Policy (1997). 1996 Quanguo tongyi de yinhang  jian
tongye chaijie shichang nianbao [1996 Annual Report for the National Interbank
Market]. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin yinhang huobi zhengcesi.38
Table 3
Financial Intermediation and Economic Development Elasticities,
Chinese Provinces 1991-97
Year All State Banks ABC/ADBC RCCs OFIs
1991 0.019  0.021 -0.418  0.169 1.187
1992 -0.032 -0.109 -0.566  0.132 0.499
1993 -0.063 -0.196 -0.701  0.013 0.478
1994 -0.179 -0.326 -0.739 -0.104 0.396
1995 -0.177 -0.353 -0.733 -0.108 0.559
1996 -0.219 -0.419 -0.685 -0.114 0.735
1997 -0.242 -0.411 0.508
Notes:  Estimates in bold are different from zero at the 10 percent significance level.
Elasticities are coefficient estimates from annual bivariate regressions of the log of
financial intermediation rate (loans/output) on the log of output per capita.  State banks
include commercial and policy banks and exclude cooperatives or non-bank financial
institutions.  ABC=Agricultural Bank of China, ADBC=Agricultural Development Bank
of China, RCC=Rural Credit Cooperatives, OFI=other financial institutions, including
Urban Credit Cooperatives, national and regional commercial banks, and national trust
and investment companies. For all, state banks, and OFIs, output is GDP and population
is total population.  For ABCs and RCCs, output is rural social output value and
population is rural population.  Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin,
and Shanghai) and Tibet.  State bank estimates also exclude Guangxi due to missing data.39
Table 4
Summary Statistics by Year, 1991-97
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Intermediation Rates
     All Financial Inst.* 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.87
     State Banks** 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.69
     ABCs/ADBCs 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.16
     RCCs 0.096 0.097 0.082 0.067 0.068 0.070
     OFIs* 0.053 0.066 0.074 0.086 0.090 0.088 0.97
Loan-deposit Ratios
     All Financial Inst.* 1.21 1.16 1.11 1.03 0.96 0.91 0.93
     State Banks** 1.27 1.17 1.19 1.12 1.04 0.97 1.01
     ABCs/ADBCs 1.42 1.36 1.31 1.34 1.62 1.62 1.61
     RCCs 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.70
     OFIs* 1.24 1.34 1.13 0.85 0.80 0.79 0.81
Econ. Performance
     GDP Per Capita 3.38 3.81 4.30 4.55 4.77 5.35 5.78
     GDP Growth 0.105 0.143 0.142 0.071 0.095 0.099 0.090
     Ind. Share of GDP 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41
     Industrial Growth 0.118 0.197 0.230 0.086 0.078 0.103 0.104
     RSOV Per Capita 3.74 4.72 6.47 8.07 8.47 9.29
     RSOV Growth 0.113 0.280 0.388 0.257 0.066 0.106
     Nonag. Share of
RSOV
0.55 0.63 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.73
     Nonag Rural
Growth
0.180 0.450 0.583 0.295 0.061 0.125
Policy Variables
     SOE Output Value
P.C.
2.23 2.46 2.70 2.50 2.44 2.15 2.11
     SOE Profits
     (Per 1000 Yuan
Assets)
11.9 12.4 12.9 12.6 9.3 7.6 7.3
     Grain Output P.C. 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.54
Value unit: 1996 thousand yuan.
* OFI loans and deposits calculated by subtracting state bank and RCC values from all
loans and deposits.  All loans and deposits have missing data—3 provinces in 1991 and
1992, 2 provinces in 1993, one province in 1994.  Means for NBFI loan/deposit rates
exclude observations when deposits equal zero (6 in 1991, 1 in 1992, 3 in 1993, and 1 in
1994).
** Means for state banks intermediation rates and loan-deposit ratios exclude Guangxi
due to missing data.40
Notes: All means are weighted and exclude municipal provinces (Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai) and Tibet.  RSOV=rural social output value, SOE=state-owned enterprise,
ABC=Agricultural Bank of China, ADBC=Agricultural Development Bank of China,
RCC=Rural Credit Cooperatives, OFI=other financial institutions (excluding RCCs).
State banks include commercial and policy banks and exclude cooperatives and non-bank
financial institutions.41
Table 5
Determinants of Financial Intermediation Rates
Within Between
1991-94 1995-96/97 Diff. 1991-96/97
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. p-value Coef S.E.
State Banks
NSH 0.076 0.225 0.050 0.232 0.861 0.223 0.550
NG*NSH -0.065 0.194 -0.319 0.238 0.381 -5.563 2.212
AG*(1-NSH) -0.094 0.101 0.033 0.097 0.361 1.425 1.496
LY -0.192 0.057 -0.253 0.053 0.017 0.090 0.075
GRAIN 17.42 3.79 6.66 4.08 0.000 15.53 8.36
SOEY 0.277 0.087 0.299 0.097 0.755 0.257 0.271
SOEP*SOEY -0.00001 0.00157 0.00049 0.00197 0.702 -0.01145 0.00362
BDEP -0.054 0.155 0.344 0.114 0.001 1.161 0.316
TDEP 0.124 0.126 -0.171 0.093 0.000 -0.381 0.206
N
R-squared
166
0.984
25
0.898
ABC/ADBCs
NSH -0.078 0.080 -0.009 0.094 0.245 -0.076 0.143
NG*NSH 0.006 0.030 0.097 0.035 0.033 -0.624 0.233
AG*(1-NSH) -0.072 0.062 -0.093 0.118 0.871 2.659 0.795
LY -0.095 0.022 -0.106 0.021 0.261 0.076 0.025
GRAIN 250.89 77.21 147.607 180.271 0.465 633.58 225.72
SOEY 0.029 0.023 0.087 0.029 0.003 0.078 0.044
SOEP*SOEY 0.00005 0.00060 -0.00022 0.00087 0.620 -0.00108 0.00109
ADEP 0.600 0.162 0.839 0.222 0.066 1.084 0.242
TDEP -0.041 0.025 -0.032 0.029 0.611 -0.124 0.043
N
R-squared
141
0.990
25
0.942
Notes: Bold denotes different than zero at the 10 percent significance.  Within estimates
for state banks and OFIs are from 2-equation SUR fixed effects model with time
dummies and period interaction terms for 1991-97.  Within estimates for ABC/ADBCs
and RCCs are from 4-equation SUR fixed effects model with time dummies and period
interaction terms for 1991-96.  Between estimates are from 4-equation SUR model of
provincial means from 1991-96 or 1991-97.  Within estimates include time dummies.
Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) and those with
missing data (Tibet and Guangxi).  For state banks and OFIs, intermediation rate is
loans/GDP.  For ABC/ADBCs and RCCs, intermediation rate is loans/RSOV (rural social
output value).   [continued on next page]42
Table 5
Determinants of Financial Intermediation Rates, cont.
Within Between
1991-94 1995-96/97 Diff. 1991-96/97
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. p-value Coef S.E.
RCCs
NSH 0.049 0.024 0.074 0.026 0.163 0.044 0.043
NG*NSH -0.006 0.009 -0.009 0.010 0.775 -0.112 0.071
AG*(1-NSH) 0.024 0.018 -0.036 0.034 0.105 0.093 0.242
LY -0.023 0.007 -0.023 0.007 0.853 0.001 0.008
GRAIN -23.61 22.35 16.17 50.58 0.310 -79.53 70.87
SOEY 0.012 0.007 0.019 0.008 0.219 0.007 0.015
SOEP*SOEY 0.00000 0.00017 -0.00013 0.00024 0.362 -0.00001 0.00034
RDEP 0.464 0.048 0.392 0.067 0.077 0.813 0.084
TDEP -0.015 0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.068 -0.019 0.016
N
R-squared
141
0.980
25
0.907
OFIs
NSH -0.178 0.127 -0.583 0.126 0.000 -0.017 0.096
NG*NSH 0.116 0.109 0.273 0.135 0.336 0.047 0.441
AG*(1-NSH) -0.160 0.057 -0.027 0.054 0.089 -0.344 0.289
LY 0.078 0.033 0.070 0.030 0.571 0.034 0.015
GRAIN -1.51 2.09 -4.13 2.25 0.095 4.19 1.59
SOEY -0.021 0.049 0.002 0.054 0.531 -0.042 0.050
SOEP*SOEY -0.00222 0.00088 -0.00141 0.00110 0.255 -0.00049 0.00068
ODEP 0.548 0.100 0.891 0.064 0.000 0.701 0.081
TDEP 0.201 0.035 0.083 0.034 0.000 0.018 0.025
N
R-squared
166
0.932
25
0.938
Notes (continued): For state banks and OFIs independent variables are as follows:
NSH=industrial share of GDP (including construction), NG=growth rate of industrial
GDP, AG=growth rate of non-industrial GDP, LY=log(GDP per capita), GRAIN=grain
production/GDP, SOEY=SOE output value/GDP, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000 yuan
fixed assets, BDEP=bank deposits/GDP, ODEP=OFI deposits/GDP, and TDEP=total
deposits/GDP.  For ABC/ADBCs and RCCs, independent variables are as follows:
NSH=nonagricultural share of RSOV, NG=growth rate of nonagricultural RSOV,
AG=growth rate of agricultural RSOV, LY=log(RSOV per capita), GRAIN=grain
production/RSOV, SOEY=SOE output value/RSOV, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000 yuan
fixed assets, ADEP=ABC/ADBC deposits/RSOV, RDEP=RCC deposits/RSOV,
TDEP=total bank deposits/RSOV.43
Appendix Table 1
Provincial Financial Intermediation Rates and Loan-Deposit Ratios, 1991-97 Means
(Sorted by All Bank Intermediation Rate)
Financial Intermediation Rates Loan/Deposit Ratios
All
Banks
*
State
Bank
s
ABC/
ADBC RCCs OFIs*
All
Banks*
State
Banks
ABC/A
DBC RCCs OFIs*
HAINAN 1.51 1.16 0.48 0.09 0.29 0.93 1.03 1.31 0.55 0.66
JILIN 1.47 1.31 0.57 0.07 0.10 1.59 1.78 3.42 0.66 1.15
QINGHAI 1.35 1.31 0.50 0.04 0.02 1.53 1.61 1.53 0.47 0.55
TIANJIN 1.33 1.14 0.16 0.08 0.09 1.16 1.26 1.16 0.75 0.78
BEIJING 1.32 1.14 0.25 0.11 0.12 0.54 0.54 0.99 0.49 0.73
NINGXIA 1.28 1.14 0.47 0.08 0.08 1.20 1.26 1.54 0.51 1.62
SHANGHAI 1.23 1.05 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.90 0.94 0.89 0.71 0.73
SHAANXI 1.18 0.99 0.27 0.12 0.07 1.11 1.22 1.57 0.69 0.83
GANSU 1.13 0.99 0.28 0.06 0.07 1.09 1.15 1.49 0.59 1.06
LIAONING 1.09 0.88 0.20 0.09 0.13 1.16 1.28 1.54 0.84 0.85
SHANXI 1.08 0.89 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.90 1.05 1.22 0.71 0.77
GUANGDONG 1.05 0.68 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.82 0.80
XINJIANG 1.03 0.95 0.69 0.04 0.05 1.04 1.08 1.58 0.45 1.67
INNER
MONGOLIA 1.00 0.93 0.35 0.05 0.03 1.46 1.56 2.49 0.60 3.53
HEILONGJ 0.97 0.90 0.45 0.06 0.03 1.25 1.30 2.40 0.61 37.26
JIANGXI 0.92 0.79 0.25 0.06 0.06 1.20 1.34 1.88 0.62 0.88
GUIZHOU 0.89 0.81 0.31 0.05 0.03 1.20 1.30 1.99 0.73 0.58
HUBEI 0.84 0.80 0.29 0.05 0.05 1.18 1.43 2.06 0.63 0.74
SICHUAN 0.83 0.67 0.18 0.07 0.08 1.16 1.32 1.69 0.75 0.83
HEBEI 0.82 0.61 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.93 0.98 1.22 0.67 2.97
HENAN 0.80 0.64 0.18 0.08 0.05 1.11 1.22 1.86 0.83 0.77
ANHUI 0.74 0.62 0.17 0.04 0.06 1.25 1.37 2.25 0.60 40.28
YUNNAN 0.74 0.65 0.32 0.08 0.03 0.84 0.87 1.21 0.60 1.42
HUNAN 0.72 0.54 0.19 0.07 0.09 1.22 1.22 1.89 0.64 2.94
SHANDONG 0.71 0.54 0.11 0.07 0.07 1.03 1.14 1.33 0.72 1.03
ZHEJIANG 0.66 0.45 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.86 0.86 1.02 0.69 4.81
JIANGSU 0.63 0.51 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.91 0.95 1.16 0.71 1.66
FUJIAN 0.63 0.53 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.68 0.88
 *Means for all banks and OFIs have missing data: Shanxi (1991-94), Hubei (1991-93),
and Guangdong (1991-92).  Mean OFI loan/deposit ratios also exclude years when
deposits are zero, which occurs 11 times, and more than once only for Inner Mongolia
(1991, 1994) and Hunan (1991-93).
Notes:  Tibet and Guangxi excluded due to missing data.  ABC/ADBC=Agricultural
Bank of China/Agricultural Development Bank of China, RCC=Rural Credit
Cooperatives, OFI=Other Financial Institutions (excluding RCCs).44
Appendix Table 2
Economic and Policy Variables by Province, 1991-97 Means
(Sorted by All Bank Intermediation Rate)
GDP
Per
Capita
GDP
Growth
Rate
Indust.
Share
of GDP
RSOV
Per
Capita
RSOV
Growth
Rate
Indust.
Share
of
RSOV
SOE
Output
Value
Per
Capita
SOE
Profits
Per 100
Yuan
Assets
Grain
Output
Per
Capita
HAINAN 5.1 0.10 0.12 5.2 0.12 0.22 1.3 6 0.43
JILIN 4.3 0.09 0.40 6.1 0.16 0.51 3.5 7 1.36
QINGHAI 3.7 0.04 0.31 2.2 0.07 0.26 2.5 3 0.37
TIANJIN 9.9 0.08 0.50 26.5 0.15 0.88 8.6 11 0.51
BEIJING 12.7 0.05 0.37 26.2 0.05 0.82 9.6 14 0.70
NINGXIA 3.4 0.06 0.35 2.7 0.11 0.41 2.6 6 0.60
SHANGHAI 18.4 0.09 0.53 43.5 0.17 0.89 16.4 16 0.57
SHAANXI 3.1 0.07 0.36 3.5 0.10 0.57 2.1 6 0.39
GANSU 2.6 0.06 0.37 3.0 0.16 0.51 2.3 7 0.37
LIAONING 7.3 0.07 0.45 13.3 0.24 0.74 5.7 7 0.67
SHANXI 3.8 0.07 0.46 5.5 0.22 0.76 2.6 7 0.40
GUANGDONG 7.8 0.14 0.41 9.0 0.18 0.70 2.8 15 0.32
XINJIANG 5.3 0.08 0.27 5.7 0.09 0.21 3.3 5 0.86
INNER
MONGOLIA 3.8 0.07 0.31 4.9 0.20 0.44 2.2 7 0.83
HEILONGJ 5.5 0.09 0.47 6.8 0.18 0.50 4.1 16 1.41
JIANGXI 3.1 0.10 0.30 4.4 0.13 0.54 1.7 8 0.52
GUIZHOU 2.0 0.05 0.32 1.9 0.09 0.36 1.2 13 0.31
HUBEI 4.2 0.09 0.39 6.0 0.18 0.58 2.7 11 0.60
SICHUAN 3.2 0.09 0.34 4.4 0.17 0.61 1.7 8 0.47
HEBEI 4.4 0.12 0.42 6.1 0.22 0.70 2.2 13 0.47
HENAN 3.3 0.12 0.40 5.1 0.21 0.67 1.7 11 0.45
ANHUI 3.2 0.10 0.41 5.7 0.24 0.65 1.6 12 0.50
YUNNAN 3.3 0.07 0.37 2.6 0.13 0.40 2.0 42 0.35
HUNAN 3.5 0.09 0.32 5.0 0.22 0.58 1.7 12 0.51
SHANDONG 5.7 0.11 0.42 10.2 0.19 0.74 2.8 10 0.56
ZHEJIANG 7.8 0.13 0.45 15.5 0.24 0.83 2.6 14 0.42
JIANGSU 7.1 0.12 0.47 15.5 0.19 0.81 3.4 11 0.62
FUJIAN 6.3 0.17 0.34 8.6 0.28 0.67 1.3 17 0.35
 Notes:  Unit is 1996 1000 yuan, 1000 kgs.  Means for variables including RSOV are for
1991-96.  Tibet and Guangxi excluded due to missing data.  GDP=gross domestic
product, RSOV=rural social output value, SOE=state-owned enterprises.  GDP per capita
and SOE output value per capita based on total population, RSOV per capita and grain
output per capita based on rural population.45
Appendix Table 3A
Determinants of State Bank Intermediation Rates, Annual Regressions 1991-1997
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
NSH -0.509 0.420 0.628 0.511 -0.515 0.525 -0.512 0.600 -0.759 0.468 -1.410 0.471 -1.368 0.377
NG*NSH -1.438 1.075 -1.104 0.704 0.460 0.903 -0.173 1.083 -1.029 0.974 -0.083 0.983 -2.681 1.384
AG*(1-NSH) -1.220 0.524 -0.486 0.555 0.557 0.530 -1.583 0.677 0.509 0.332 -0.459 0.805 -2.041 1.681
LY 0.181 0.069 0.036 0.074 0.100 0.091 0.134 0.091 -0.007 0.084 0.047 0.087 0.072 0.081
GRAIN 23.79 5.81 22.16 6.68 21.55 8.60 17.02 7.07 6.83 11.80 3.84 9.50 -0.39 10.10
SOEY 0.330 0.175 0.353 0.205 0.588 0.191 0.338 0.272 0.397 0.203 0.887 0.344 0.925 0.256
SOEP*SOEY -
0.0073
9
0.0048
4
-
0.02019 0.00451
-
0.0080
8
0.0046
9
-
0.0068
8
0.0023
6
-
0.0093
4
0.0035
8
-
0.0116
6 0.00532
-
0.01438 0.00656
BDEP 0.690 0.303 1.405 0.316 1.305 0.373 1.430 0.458 1.370 0.388 0.881 0.418 0.624 0.310
TDEP 0.445 0.258 -0.430 0.238 -0.401 0.243 -0.581 0.310 -0.422 0.252 -0.263 0.248 -0.166 0.213
C -0.741 0.270 -0.320 0.270 -0.493 0.364 -0.231 0.347 0.282 0.417 0.370 0.363 0.613 0.426
N
R-squared
22
0.919
22
0.918
23
0.874
24
0.903
25
0.873
25
0.863
25
0.894
Notes: Bold denotes different than zero at the 10 percent significance.  Within estimates include time dummies.  Dependent variable is
loans by state banks divided by GDP.  Each equation is jointly estimated with those for the determinants of ABC/ADBC and RCC
intermediation rates.  Independent variables are defined as follows:  NSH=industrial share of GDP (including construction),
NG=growth rate of industrial GDP interacted with NSH, AG=growth rate of non-industrial GDP interacted with (1-NSH),
LY=log(GDP per capita), GRAIN=grain production/GDP, SOEY=SOE output value/GDP, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000 yuan fixed
assets, BDEP=bank deposits.  State banks include commercial and policy banks and exclude cooperatives or non-bank financial
institutions.  Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) and those with missing data (Tibet and Guangxi).46
Appendix Table 3B
Determinants of ABC/ADBC Intermediation Rates, Annual Regressions 1991-1996
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
NSH -0.218 0.128 0.129 0.172 0.032 0.120 -0.299 0.105 -0.402 0.098 -0.428 0.110
NG*NSH -0.709 0.352 -0.466 0.226 -0.091 0.078 0.051 0.085 0.033 0.040 0.137 0.069
AG*(1-
NSH) -0.579 0.282 0.496 0.549 0.720 0.391 0.055 0.190 0.214 0.272 -0.802 0.484
LY 0.142 0.027 0.114 0.030 0.080 0.022 0.090 0.019 0.096 0.014 0.094 0.016
GRAIN 670.20 155.69 1067.19 188.96 1315.12 174.68 1356.64 204.16 1534.94 202.88 1833.79 472.78
SOEY 0.023 0.060 -0.014 0.049 -0.010 0.036 0.014 0.030 0.063 0.027 0.012 0.077
SOEP*SO
EY -0.00363 0.00142 -0.00446 0.00146 0.00008 0.00096 -0.00066 0.00054 -0.00096 0.00075 -0.00062 0.00147
ADEP 0.840 0.219 1.210 0.244 1.275 0.179 0.495 0.194 0.346 0.266 0.731 0.279
TDEP -0.082 0.065 -0.086 0.044 -0.119 0.038 0.031 0.033 0.048 0.030 0.013 0.042
C -0.302 0.126 -0.468 0.115 -0.415 0.097 -0.234 0.090 -0.190 0.076 -0.151 0.094
N
R-squared
22
0.932
22
0.945
23
0.969
24
0.973
25
0.982
25
0.975
Notes: Bold denotes different than zero at the 10 percent significance.  Within estimates include time dummies.  Dependent variable is
loans by ABC/ADBCs divided by rural social output value (RSOV).  Each equation is jointly estimated with those for the
determinants of state bank and RCC intermediation rates. Independent variables are defined as follows:  NSH=nonagricultural share of
RSOV, NG=growth rate of nonagricultural RSOV interacted with NSH, AG=growth rate of agricultural RSOV interacted with (1-
NSH), LY=log(RSOV per capita), GRAIN=grain production/RSOV, SOEY=SOE output value/RSOV, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000
yuan fixed assets, ADEP=deposits in ABC/ADBC, BDEP=bank deposits.  Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin,
and Shanghai) and those with missing data (Tibet and Guangxi).47
Appendix Table 3C
Determinants of RCC Intermediation Rates, Annual Regressions 1991-1996
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
NSH -0.003 0.034 0.010 0.053 -0.047 0.042 0.013 0.039 0.017 0.034 0.050 0.040
NG*NSH -0.161 0.080 -0.025 0.065 0.001 0.030 0.003 0.029 -0.006 0.014 -0.005 0.017
AG*(1-
NSH) 0.011 0.068 0.189 0.134 -0.052 0.147 -0.053 0.063 -0.108 0.094 -0.138 0.106
LY -0.002 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.005
GRAIN -72.98 39.95 -32.69 52.08 -79.88 72.86 4.89 64.32 -36.77 71.11 106.14 127.83
SOEY 0.006 0.016 0.004 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.011 -0.018 0.024
SOEP*SO
EY 0.00002 0.00035 0.00003 0.00041 -0.00039 0.00040 -0.00016 0.00018 -0.00023 0.00025 0.00005 0.00031
RDEP 0.715 0.056 0.763 0.075 0.987 0.063 0.821 0.078 0.815 0.084 0.753 0.076
TDEP -0.029 0.014 -0.019 0.010 -0.053 0.014 -0.013 0.013 -0.009 0.013 0.005 0.014
C 0.053 0.031 -0.008 0.031 0.004 0.039 -0.034 0.028 -0.024 0.026 -0.042 0.023
N
R-squared
22
0.893
22
0.837
23
0.887
24
0.928
25
0.932
25
0.959
Notes: Bold denotes different than zero at the 10 percent significance.  Within estimates include time dummies.  Dependent variable is
loans by RCCs divided by rural social output value (RSOV).  Each equation is jointly estimated with those for the determinants of
state bank and ABC intermediation rates. Independent variables are defined as follows:  NSH=nonagricultural share of RSOV,
NG=growth rate of nonagricultural RSOV interacted with NSH, AG=growth rate of agricultural RSOV interacted with (1-NSH),
LY=log(RSOV per capita), GRAIN=grain production/RSOV, SOEY=SOE output value/RSOV, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000 yuan
fixed assets, RDEP=deposits in RCCs, BDEP=bank deposits.  Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai)
and those with missing data (Tibet and Guangxi).48
Appendix Table 3D
Determinants of Other Financial Institution Intermediation Rates, Annual Regressions 1991-1997
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
NSH 0.333 0.144 0.162 0.110 0.135 0.066 -0.063 0.082 -0.147 0.078 -0.146 0.085 -0.247 0.108
NG*NSH 0.107 0.399 -0.134 0.163 0.062 0.129 -0.194 0.176 0.411 0.180 0.184 0.195 0.504 0.407
AG*(1-NSH) -0.041 0.182 -0.079 0.131 -0.258 0.077 -0.013 0.142 -0.030 0.060 0.119 0.156 0.162 0.485
LY -0.008 0.025 0.043 0.016 0.002 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.023
GRAIN 0.97 2.04 5.18 1.50 0.40 1.32 1.92 1.40 0.71 2.19 0.29 1.90 2.62 2.94
SOEY 0.062 0.062 -0.068 0.045 -0.003 0.025 -0.033 0.041 0.027 0.036 0.036 0.060 0.002 0.064
SOEP*SOEY -
0.0030
2
0.0016
7
-
0.00002 0.00102
-
0.0015
9
0.0007
2
-
0.0005
0
0.0004
7
-
0.0005
6
0.0006
4
-
0.0003
7 0.00103 0.00118 0.00181
ODEP 0.278 0.147 0.608 0.097 0.566 0.079 0.849 0.122 0.861 0.103 0.963 0.097 0.854 0.096
TDEP -0.064 0.051 0.068 0.031 0.044 0.024 -0.026 0.035 -0.032 0.035 -0.053 0.037 -0.027 0.038
C -0.028 0.097 -0.229 0.062 -0.038 0.059 0.009 0.067 -0.023 0.078 -0.024 0.072 -0.001 0.122
N
R-squared
22
0.607
22
0.920
23
0.902
24
0.919
25
0.933
25
0.952
25
0.933
Notes: Bold denotes different than zero at the 10 percent significance.  Within estimates include time dummies.  Dependent variable is
loans by state banks divided by GDP.  Each equation is jointly estimated with those for the determinants of ABC/ADBC and RCC
intermediation rates.  Independent variables are defined as follows:  NSH=industrial share of GDP (including construction),
NG=growth rate of industrial GDP interacted with NSH, AG=growth rate of non-industrial GDP interacted with (1-NSH),
LY=log(GDP per capita), GRAIN=grain production/GDP, SOEY=SOE output value/GDP, SOEP=SOE profits per 1000 yuan fixed
assets, BDEP=bank deposits.  State banks include commercial and policy banks and exclude cooperatives or non-bank financial
institutions.  Excluded provinces are municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) and those with missing data (Tibet and Guangxi).Appendix Table 4
Determinants of Intermediation Rates using Lagged Variables and 3SLS
Lagged Variables 3SLS
1991-94 1995-96/97 diff. 1991-94 1995-96/97 diff.
Coef S.E. Coef. S.E. p-value Coef S.E. Coef. S.E. p-value
State Banks
NSH -0.143 0.276 -0.121 0.243 0.901 -0.465 0.366 -0.728 0.434 0.227
NG*NSH -0.182 0.225 -0.312 0.217 0.654 -0.870 0.757 0.623 0.632 0.227
AG*(1-NSH) 0.014 0.099 0.149 0.099 0.307 0.066 0.212 0.244 0.180 0.583
LY -0.078 0.058 -0.175 0.054 0.001 -0.195 0.130 -0.286 0.134 0.006
GRAIN 24.58 3.72 9.86 4.29 0.000 21.07 5.77 6.10 5.68 0.000
SOEY 0.203 0.106 0.179 0.105 0.764 0.233 0.123 0.339 0.142 0.319
SOEP*SOEY 0.00272 0.00278 0.00137 0.00173 0.435 0.00171 0.00233 0.00313 0.00279 0.420
BDEP -0.192 0.167 0.293 0.124 0.000 -0.039 0.208 0.344 0.136 0.021
TDEP 0.251 0.136 -0.092 0.102 0.000 0.050 0.154 -0.228 0.115 0.004
OFIs
NSH 0.018 0.141 -0.478 0.120 0.000 0.209 0.209 -0.159 0.239 0.001
NG*NSH -0.169 0.116 0.150 0.111 0.032 0.031 0.414 -0.155 0.331 0.774
AG*(1-NSH) -0.066 0.050 -0.137 0.050 0.291 -0.281 0.114 0.019 0.096 0.078
LY 0.083 0.030 0.083 0.028 0.996 -0.066 0.080 -0.059 0.080 0.693
GRAIN -3.23 1.86 -4.65 2.16 0.345 -6.56 3.19 -8.06 3.13 0.460
SOEY -0.055 0.054 0.022 0.052 0.039 -0.118 0.072 -0.134 0.082 0.773
SOEP*SOEY -0.00384 0.00140 -0.00160 0.00089 0.010 -0.00196 0.00129 -0.00137 0.00157 0.517
ODEP 0.562 0.097 0.912 0.064 0.000 0.696 0.132 0.892 0.075 0.089
TDEP 0.171 0.034 0.060 0.033 0.000 0.180 0.061 0.082 0.047 0.013
ABC/ADBCs
NSH -0.110 0.082 -0.141 0.089 0.528 -0.007 0.089 0.049 0.106 0.381
NG*NSH -0.011 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.279 0.001 0.048 0.060 0.041 0.354
AG*(1-NSH) -0.084 0.046 -0.173 0.080 0.323 -0.008 0.078 -0.218 0.154 0.220
LY -0.009 0.030 -0.008 0.028 0.931 -0.093 0.025 -0.102 0.024 0.405
GRAIN 349.63 68.28 315.12 159.38 0.786 265.41 80.39 204.93 191.85 0.689
SOEY 0.099 0.026 0.166 0.031 0.000 0.036 0.025 0.096 0.031 0.003
SOEP*SOEY -0.00129 0.00086 -0.00109 0.00060 0.680 0.00002 0.00065 -0.00024 0.00092 0.646
ADEP 0.726 0.157 0.842 0.208 0.337 0.585 0.171 0.794 0.231 0.122
TDEP -0.037 0.024 -0.024 0.029 0.469 -0.042 0.025 -0.030 0.030 0.513
RCCs
NSH 0.050 0.023 0.069 0.029 0.309 0.073 0.028 0.113 0.031 0.049
NG*NSH -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.009 0.992 0.024 0.015 -0.027 0.013 0.010
AG*(1-NSH) -0.002 0.013 -0.022 0.023 0.432 0.015 0.023 -0.110 0.047 0.018
LY -0.007 0.009 -0.004 0.009 0.329 -0.022 0.008 -0.021 0.008 0.738
GRAIN -16.44 18.92 35.77 44.17 0.141 -14.39 24.74 66.74 57.50 0.070
SOEY 0.028 0.007 0.037 0.009 0.090 0.021 0.008 0.027 0.009 0.387
SOEP*SOEY -0.00033 0.00024 -0.00037 0.00017 0.732 -0.00019 0.00019 -0.00030 0.00027 0.501
RDEP 0.514 0.042 0.452 0.068 0.160 0.482 0.056 0.402 0.074 0.073
TDEP -0.014 0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.099 -0.015 0.004 -0.003 0.008 0.078
Notes: In lagged variable regression, all variables except GRAIN and the deposit
variables (TDEP, BDEP, ADEP, RDEP, and ODEP) are one-year lagged variables.  In
the 3SLS model, all economic fundamentals are taken as endogenous (NSH, NG*NSH,
AG*(1-NSH), LY), and additional instruments are the lagged economic fundamentals
and lagged SOE output and profit variables.  Results for state banks and OFIs are from 2-
equation SUR fixed effects model with time dummies for 1991-97.  Results from
ABC/ADBC and RCCs are from 4-equation SUR fixed effects model with time dummies
for 1991-96.